Boyce Worthley Oration. \u27Drawing the line\u27: A risk communication perspective by Croft, Rodney J
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers Faculty of Social Sciences
2015
Boyce Worthley Oration. 'Drawing the line': A risk
communication perspective
Rodney J. Croft
University of Wollongong, rcroft@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Croft, R. J. (2015). Boyce Worthley Oration. 'Drawing the line': A risk communication perspective. Radiation Protection in
Australasia, 32 (2), 2-10.
Boyce Worthley Oration. 'Drawing the line': A risk communication
perspective
Abstract
The paper represents a text version of the Australian Radiation Protection Society's Boyce Worthley Oration,
which I had the privilege of delivering in 2014. The purpose of the presentation was to address the issue of
whether, from a risk communication perspective, enough radiation protection research had been conducted
and it was time to 'draw the line'. The paper addresses this issue by focusing on the radiofrequency (RF) risk
communication domain, but is also applicable to radiation protection more generally. It fi rst provides a brief
overview of both community concern about RF and the relative support from science regarding this concern,
where it is argued that the science does not provide support for such concern. It then looks at some of the
reasons for this discrepancy, and argues that it is due to the very complex, very 'normal' ways that humans
process information and create meaning from it, but which consequently also leads to error and limits the
applicability of specifi c communication strategies to the community more generally. Drawing the above
conclusions together the paper then argues that regardless of how certain RF health research outcomes are or
could in principle be in the future, there will remain a strong need to adapt to the complexity of people's
interpretation of the science, and that this will necessitate both further RF risk communication and RF basic
science research; it concludes that no line can be drawn. On a more positive note the paper also looks at what
risk communication is doing in the RF domain, and provides some practical advice aimed at improving risk
communication outcomes.
Keywords
line, risk, communication, perspective, worthley, boyce, oration, drawing
Disciplines
Education | Social and Behavioral Sciences
Publication Details
Croft, R. J. (2015). Boyce Worthley Oration. 'Drawing the line': A risk communication perspective. Radiation
Protection in Australasia, 32 (2), 2-10.
This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/2228
2
Radiation Protection in Australasia (2015) Vol. 32, No. 2 ARPS39 Conference Paper
PROLOGUE
It was a great honour to be invited to deliver the 
Australian Radiation Protection Society’s (ARPS) 
2014 Boyce Worthley Oration, and in particular to 
be associated with someone who has contributed 
to the radiation safety domain in such a sustained 
and community-centred manner. I felt too that 
the task I was given was particularly appropriate 
given Worthley’s lifelong contribution to the area, 
as it was an opportunity to pause and consider 
whether it was time, in terms of radiofrequency 
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(RF) electromagnetic radiation research, to draw 
the line; or in other words to check whether further 
research effort would benefi t society, rather than 
being merely an academic exercise. As a risk 
communication perspective, this will be addressed 
via detailed consideration of risk communication 
itself, but as will be seen in the fi nal section, the 
answer to this has direct ramifi cations for RF 
health research more generally. It should also be 
noted that although focusing on RF, the discussion 
and conclusions drawn are also directly relevant 
to radiation protection more generally.
The present paper represents an attempt to 
communicate, in manuscript format, the 2014 
Boyce Worthley Oration which addressed this 
issue. As the Oration was provided in the form of 
a conversation-like presentation to discussion with 
the 2014 ARPS delegates, I clearly run the risk of 
mixing formats and confusing the message that I 
hope to communicate. I will thus attempt to follow 
the narrative of the Oration as far as practicable, 
which I hope the reader will understand may result 
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in less ‘detail’ than might otherwise be expected in 
a journal paper, as well as necessitate changes to 
the structure of the presentation in order to capture 
the essence of it. 
RF HEALTH AND COMMUNITY 
CONCERN – WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
With the growing use of RF-based technologies, 
ranging from mobile phones, base stations, 
wi-fi  and smart metres to product identifi cation 
scanners and even wireless baby monitors, RF 
is omnipresent in today’s society. RF exposure 
is not new. However, while more traditional 
sources of RF (such as FM radio) tend to be 
viewed as benign by the community, there has 
been strong community concern that these newer 
RF technologies are causing harm. This concern 
relates to a wide range of health effects, from 
annoying sensations on the skin, to potentially 
fatal diseases such as cancer. Accordingly the 
degree of concern can vary greatly, from a 
theoretical belief that has little or no impact on 
daily life, to complete preoccupation with the RF 
‘threat’. In the latter case, this has led to some 
removing themselves from what they perceive as 
the ‘RF world’, including sacrifi cing employment 
and domicile, to move to a location, typically rural, 
which is thought to have lower RF emissions.
It is diffi cult to determine how widespread this 
concern is in the community, nor how strong. A 
number of surveys have been conducted to obtain 
data on the matter, but in order to provide adequate 
representation of the community the questions 
have had to be brief and relatively crude. However, 
as an indication, a Special Eurobarometer report 
on electromagnetic fi elds in 2010 found that 33% 
of respondents reported that mobile phone base 
stations affected their health ‘to a large extent’, 
with values ranging from 79% in Italy to 6% in 
Finland1. This does not necessarily mean that 
the 6-79% believe that RF impacts importantly 
on their lives, but it does provide an indication 
that a large number of people believe, at least 
from a theoretical perspective, that RF is indeed 
harmful.
This concern is highlighted in the ‘news’ media, 
with reports often suggesting that technologies 
such as mobile phones and base stations cause a 
range of health issues. For example, in relation 
to what is often referred to as Electromagnetic 
Hypersensitivity (EHS; a condition whereby 
people ‘report’ being adversely affected by RF), 
the majority of media reports have claimed 
that RF indeed causes the symptoms2. It is also 
increasingly common to see community actions 
designed to restrict RF exposure beyond the 
restrictions imposed by governmental regulation 
(for example “Stop Smart Meters”3 and “No Towers 
Near Schools”4 are community organisations in 
Australia developed for this purpose), and although 
rare, it is becoming more common to see law suits 
that attempt to obtain fi nancial compensation for 
health issues that are claimed to be caused by 
RF exposure (e.g. McDonald versus Comcare5). 
Particularly given the large number of RF emitting 
devices in the modern world, if such claims are 
correct, this would represent an important health 
effect requiring not only the reconsideration of 
governmental regulation, but also unambiguous 
communication of such risks.
THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ON 
RF AND HEALTH – IS THE PUBLIC 
CONCERN JUSTIFIED?
However, when we consider the scientific 
literature addressing the issue of potential health 
effects from ‘low level’ RF (i.e. of or below the 
magnitude typically encountered from mobile 
telecommunication devices), the above concern is 
not supported. There are of course a range of views 
in science, but there is strong consistency across 
the World Health Organisation, the International 
Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection 
(ICNIRP) and the International Association of 
Electronic and Electrical Engineers (IEEE), with 
the latter two the only international RF Guidelines/
Standards setting bodies. Their determinations 
are that there is no established evidence of harm 
resulting from low-level RF exposure. I view these 
as the most qualifi ed and appropriate groups to 
evaluate this complex issue, and the consistency 
of their evaluations, in conjunction with my own 
reading of the literature, provides me with strong 
confi dence in their conclusions.
I will not deal with the RF health literature directly, 
but given that there are a range of community and 
academic members who argue that the ICNIRP 
Guidelines and IEEE Standards are fl awed, it 
is important to highlight some of the reasons 
given for this view, as well as my reasons for 
not fi nding those arguments cogent. As far as I 
am aware, the main reasons given for criticising 
these Guidelines/Standards are: (1) The guidelines 
do not take into account non-thermal effects of 
RF; (2) The guidelines do not take into account 
cumulative RF exposure (but rather only consider 
acute exposures); and (3) The guidelines do not 
evaluate the literature adequately.
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I do not agree with these views, and in support 
of my perspective would note the following with 
reference to the ICNIRP (RF) Guidelines (of which 
I have greatest experience with): 
1. Although the majority of RF-induced health 
effects identifi ed in the guidelines are thought to 
be thermally mediated, the guidelines consider 
all health effects. Indeed although mechanistic 
knowledge is very useful, the guidelines are not 
dependent on such knowledge – they consider 
all established health effects caused by RF, and 
specify exposure levels so as to avoid them; 
2. The Guidelines do in fact take into account 
potential effects of chronic exposure. However, 
as it is diffi cult to look at chronic exposure 
experimentally in humans, the research has 
had to extrapolate from epidemiological data 
in humans and experimental designs in non-
humans (typically rodents and non-human 
primates), with no health effects demonstrated 
(beyond those at high RF levels observed 
acutely); and 
3. My personal experience with both ICNIRP and 
IEEE is that they provide very considered and 
appropriate evaluations of the literature. Indeed 
the claims made and evidence proffered by 
those with competing views are also considered 
by ICNIRP and IEEE, and, depending on its 
quality, form part of the evidence base that the 
guidelines are derived from. The following 
discussion is thus predicated on the assertion 
that there is solid scientifi c consensus that low-
level RF exposure, of or below the magnitude 
encountered from typical telecommunications 
devices such as mobile phones and base 
stations, does not cause harm.
RF HEALTH AND RISK 
COMMUNICATION – WHAT ROLE DOES 
RISK COMMUNICATION PLAY?
From the previous two sections a clear disconnect 
can be seen; there is strong community concern 
that low-level RF is harmful, and yet the scientifi c 
consensus does not support this view. So what 
is the role for risk communication in such a 
scenario? At this point we begin to diverge from 
the objectivity of science and need to incorporate 
values. That is, risk communication is the science of 
communicating, the science of altering cognitions 
and/or behaviours, but it relies on others to specify 
the target cognitions and/or behaviours.  It follows 
that in different scenarios risk communication will 
be attempting to achieve very different objectives 
– engaged by one group the communicator may be 
attempting to make the community more concerned 
about the ‘dangers’ of RF, and by another they may 
be trying to allay fears of RF. Further, although the 
motivations of those dictating the target cognitions 
and/or behaviours can vary substantially (in both 
of the above scenarios it may range from selfi sh 
to altruistic), such motivations are not the domain 
of the communicator.
For the present audience though an altruistic 
motivation is assumed, such as would be expected 
from a public health department, where the 
communicator is tasked with producing a more 
realistic appraisal of (and behaviours consistent 
with) the relative risk of RF within the community, 
so as to both maintain health and avoid unjustifi ed 
concern. The role of the risk communicator would 
therefore be to employ the communication methods 
of the profession to achieve, as far as possible, this 
end. I take this to be a very standard view within 
the radiation protection community, indeed it is 
diffi cult to imagine there being any disagreement 
over this approach. The problem is that given that 
this approach is currently being employed both 
here in Australia and internationally, and given 
the ‘disconnect’ between community concern and 
scientifi c consensus described above, this approach 
is not working as effectively as we would like.
LIMITATIONS TO THE RISK 
COMMUNICATION PROCESS – WHY THE 
DISCONNECT?
I would argue that there are two primary reasons 
for this failure, which I refer to as: (1) Semantics, 
or the hidden (and inherent) diffi culty of framing a 
simple unambiguous statement; and (2) Complexity, 
or the manner in which humans incorporate 
information and manufacture meaning from it. 
Before addressing each of these it is important 
to take a step back and look at what how risk 
communication has traditionally been seen as, as 
this is the approach that I would argue is currently 
engaged for RF risk communication.
In general  terms,  the ‘ tradit ional’ r isk 
communication model posits that once science has 
reached an unambiguous conclusion, that provision 
of evidence supporting that conclusion is all that 
is required to generate the appropriate cognitions 
and/or behaviours in the target audience. There 
is a vast literature dealing with the limitations of 
this view in terms of risk communication more 
generally, and correspondingly numerous models 
that provide communication methods that lead 
more effectively to the desired cognitions and/or 
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behaviours (see 6). While much of that generic 
literature has bearing on the above disconnect 
between science and perception, I will here 
focus on two particular issues in relation to the 
case of RF health communication. Specifi cally, 
I will address the assumptions that science has 
unambiguous conclusions to communicate, and 
that an intelligent and unbiased recipient will 
understand the message as intended. This, I hope, 
will identify the most salient issues that we need to 
consider in terms of NIR risk communication.
1. Semantics
It is typically assumed that given sufficient 
scientifi c investigation (and evaluation of that 
investigation), science will reach an unambiguous 
determination that can then be communicated. Let 
us assume that such an unambiguous scientifi c 
determination has been reached in relation to 
RF-Health. The question then becomes ‘How do 
we frame that determination to make it suitable 
for communication?’ At first sight this might 
appear simple, and we may arrive at a conclusion 
such as ‘low-level RF exposure does not affect 
health’ (or depending on how conclusive we 
think it is we may water this down using various 
qualifi ers). Let us assume that the research is very 
conclusive though, as this will make it easier to 
see the semantic diffi culties that the scientist-
communicator faces.
There are a number of interpretations that even this 
statement could rationally result in. For example, 
strictly speaking it is an ontological statement, 
commenting on what exists (as opposed to what 
we know), and as has been demonstrated by 
such greats as Descartes and Hume, we are not 
justifi ed in making such statements as we could be 
‘being deceived by a malignant demon’ or merely 
‘dreaming’ that the statement is correct. Thus for 
the recipient with a philosophical background, the 
statement may raise doubts because it is saying 
something that they not only believe is false (i.e. 
that we can be certain of what exists), but that the 
philosophical literature also provides strong support 
for. Unfortunately the situation is not resolved by 
restricting the intention to epistemology, where 
there is less focus on ‘what exists’ and more on 
‘justifi ed belief’ as to what exists, as the same 
arguments can be used to conclude that no beliefs 
can be adequately justifi ed.
We may decide though to look at the issue in 
terms of what the scientist is more familiar 
with. That is, assuming that such diffi culties are 
‘merely philosophical’ and deciding how we can 
frame our determination in terms of such issues 
as consistency of results, appropriateness of 
the methodologies used to obtain those results, 
and ideally the degree to which we understand 
the mechanisms responsible for any RF-health 
relations. However, this is equally problematic in 
terms of providing a clear statement with which to 
communicate. For example, if we are to say that 
‘there is no evidence that low-level RF affects 
health’, questions arise as to what we mean by 
‘evidence’ and the causal nature of ‘affects’. 
ICNIRP, for instance, looks for ‘established’ 
evidence when setting Guidelines, which is 
typically based on independently replicated effects 
with adequate methodology, and so there is nothing 
inconsistent between the above statement based on 
this interpretation, and another person asserting 
that there is evidence that low-level RF does affect 
health (in the sense of there being one study that 
asserts that there is such evidence, regardless of 
methodological adequacy or consistency with 
other research outcomes). So even seemingly 
simple terms like ‘evidence’ can be interpreted 
in very different ways, making the notion of 
designing simple statements to communicate our 
determination highly problematic.
Although this may appear to be ‘only semantics’, 
this confusion between the two meanings of 
‘evidence’ is indeed an issue that I often face when 
trying to communicate with community members 
that are very fearful due to what they interpret as 
evidence that low-level RF harms people (and their 
extrapolation to the view that standards setting 
bodies such as ARPANSA and ICNIRP must be 
disingenuous in their conclusions). Unfortunately 
this semantic issue is ubiquitous in science, as 
highlighted recently by the classifi cation of RF 
as a Class 2b Carcinogen by the International 
Association for Research into Cancer (IARC). 
IARC expands on this classifi cation by referring 
to it as ‘possibly carcinogenic’, and so although 
appearing to provide a less technical and potentially 
confusing classification, it raises substantial 
questions concerning the meaning of ‘possibly’. 
Indeed recent research attempting to determine 
how people interpret the ‘possibly carcinogenic’ 
classifi cation suggests that it is highly variable and 
generally misunderstood, and that to remedy the 
situation greater emphasis on narrative is required7. 
This research suggests that greater complexity in 
the statement is needed to produce the desired 
interpretation (for example, by providing context 
to help understand what is meant by ‘possibly 
carcinogenic’, such as through comparisons with 
other agents classifi ed as possibly carcinogenic that 
the target audience would be familiar with, such 
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as ‘coffee’), and thus that we need to move ‘away 
from’ the simple statements that we were originally 
trying to fi nd, as they are far from unambiguous.
So even relatively concise, focused, scientifi c 
summary statements may not be interpreted as 
intended, and given that as we extend the summary 
narrative to provide greater explanation we are also 
increasing the number of potentially ambiguous 
words and phrases, it is clear that designing our 
scientifi c statements is a challenging task in its 
own right. 
2. Complexity
So why is it so diffi cult to communicate what 
we would think of as simple clear statements, 
particularly given that a computer program could 
easily be written to deal reliably with such input 
statements? The answer to this is often described 
in a pejorative sense, where humanity as a whole 
is seen as irrational, biased and fl awed. Personally 
I see this as a misunderstanding of human 
nature, and rather would emphasise that these 
‘weaknesses’ can equally be seen as strengths that 
have been extremely effective in an evolutionary 
sense, and that our diffi culty communicating such 
simple statements is in many ways due to the 
sophistication or complexity of our cognitive and 
affective processes. These are normal processes 
that benefi t even the most rational of scientists, and 
I believe it is worth emphasising a small portion 
of this complexity in order to better appreciate the 
diffi culty of communication.
For example if we consider, even crudely, the 
information processing steps required to be 
cognisant of our ‘simple’ (written) scientific 
statement, we see immediately that it is far from 
simple. It is perhaps easiest to think of these 
processes in terms of a number of discrete linear 
steps. For example, as we read the above statement, 
light refl ected from the letters (and background) 
strikes the retina before passing through the optic 
nerve to the occipital cortex of the brain. Here 
it undergoes a number of sequential processes 
that extract features from the visual data until 
suffi cient to enable it to be matched against stored 
representations of letters and words. Algorithms 
are then employed to make grammatical sense 
of these letters and words, and fi nally meaning 
must be interpolated via comparison with stored 
knowledge/belief of the world more generally. 
However, the simple linear framework is an 
important oversimplifi cation. For example: (1) 
Even at the level of the retina there are dynamic 
(and imperfect) processes operating that inhibit 
some and facilitate other aspects of the visual 
stimulation, so as to enhance the signal to noise 
ratio and improve the chances of accurate uptake 
of the text; (2) Similar modulating infl uences 
operate at the level of the occipital cortex (prior 
to the text being identifi ed as letters), with these 
biased by factors such as emotional state; and (3) 
At higher levels of processing, once letters have 
been identifi ed (or to be more accurate, interpreted 
from the visual stimulation) and grammatical 
structure is being discerned, similar modulatory 
processes operate that are infl uenced by relatively 
concrete non-conscious beliefs such as expected 
frequencies of grammatical marks (e.g. within 
a given grammatical context, is ‘.’ or ‘,’ more 
likely), as well as by conscious and non-conscious 
expectations as to the likely meaning of the text. 
In other words, there is plenty of opportunity for 
both conscious and non-conscious processes to 
change ‘low-level RF exposure does not affect 
health’ to ‘low-level RF exposure does affect 
health’; after all, the human brain has over a billion 
neurons (and over 10 trillion interconnections 
between them) which shape the data arriving at 
the senses into meaningful interpretations that 
fi t within a lifetime’s experience of other such 
interpretations.
Of course as professionals we would then check 
that our interpretation of the statement was 
consistent with the remaining text, perhaps we 
would re-read it, and we would consider whether 
our interpretation was consistent with other beliefs 
that we have on the matter, and this would provide 
an opportunity to test our original interpretation and 
update it accordingly. This is a time-consuming and 
effortful process though, and not something that 
would be expected from the community recipient 
of a risk communication message. Particularly 
as we move from the ‘relatively’ simple text to 
complex statements of meaning, there is ample 
opportunity for unintended interpretations of our 
message. A common example of this was given 
above in relation to the word ‘evidence’, such 
that the statement ‘there is no evidence that low-
level RF exposure affects health’, could easily 
be interpreted as meaning that there is not one 
study that has reported such an effect, based not 
on the text, but on prior experience that has led to 
the belief that one such report ‘is’ evidence. This 
could then rationally lead to suspicion about the 
adequacy of the body providing the statement. 
Importantly, this is ‘rational’ in the sense of making 
logical conclusions based on premises (or previous 
states of belief), rather than suggesting that an 
accurate belief has been reached.
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As well as being a potential source of error, this 
constant attempt by the brain to interpret and 
modify incoming data is a crucial part of what 
has made humans successful. That is, it is not 
only a way to help separate signal from noise, but 
it also allows for very rapid responses that would 
not otherwise be possible. For example if you 
surprised an aggressive tiger in the wild, there 
would not be suffi cient time to process all of its 
features in time to avoid the danger. However, by 
sacrifi cing accuracy for speed we can enable fast 
decisions (e.g. “large + orange + in-environment-
with-tigers = run”); emotional bias plays a large 
role here, as mistaking a large toy for a tiger is 
less likely an issue than mistaking a tiger for a 
large toy, and so our experience-based emotional 
responses help steer (in this case) our response 
towards avoidance (as opposed to approach) 
behaviours.
Similarly, heuristics, or mental shortcuts that 
optimise speed/ease of interpretation over 
accuracy, are used extensively by humans to solve 
problems and make quick judgements, and for very 
good reason. As an example, if we were to study 
the background to all the stories we see on the 
nightly news in suffi cient depth to know whether 
to believe what we are told, it is likely that we 
would not have suffi cient time to watch the nightly 
news, let alone sleep. So the use of heuristics is 
perhaps the only way for us to arrive at workable 
conclusions about the world, even if necessarily 
less than accurate. This is of course the same for 
RF health and safety. The person watching the 
news and hearing that ‘there is no evidence that 
low-level RF exposure affects health’ cannot 
spend suffi cient time researching the literature 
to know whether this statement is correct, and so 
has to rely on heuristics that will necessarily differ 
from one person to another. One person might be 
guided by the heuristic that the news is always 
accurate, while another might be guided by the 
view that all RF expert bodies are controlled by 
industry, with the resultant interpretations likely 
to be antithetical.
People thus utilise heuristics extensively to make 
sense of the world, and although in general these 
‘rules of thumb’ are greatly benefi cial, a necessary 
consequence of their use is that we make many 
many mistakes as well. What is particularly 
problematic is that as the heuristics are heavily 
dependent on personal experience (in addition to 
biology), whoever controls our experience has 
the opportunity to make them more or less likely 
to result in accurate determinations. For example 
if the media or our social circle encourages a 
particular heuristic, such as scepticism towards 
radiation protection bodies, then this will shape our 
heuristic (such as by making it more diffi cult for 
our simple scientifi c statement to be believed).
FROM CONFUSION TO RISK 
COMMUNICATION – DEALING WITH 
COMPLEX SCENARIOS
So, given the inherent diffi culties of trying to 
make unambiguous scientifi c statements as well as 
dealing with the vastly different ways that people 
interpret these statements, what can be done to 
increase the alignment between message and 
resultant belief? This is where social science plays 
its role. Given the complexity of the message-
belief relation within an individual, and given that 
this complexity is interacting with that of our social 
environment (or the interactions of the interactions 
of the individuals), social science is never going to 
be in a position to completely determine this realm. 
However, just as the individual does, it can develop 
‘rules of thumb’ or heuristics that can improve the 
predictability of the message-belief relation.
At this point it may be useful to consider the Social 
Amplifi cation of Risk Framework (SARF), as it 
offers one such heuristic that helps us understand 
the diffi culty of improving the message-belief 
relation. It differs of course from the natural 
sciences in that there is greater variability and 
thus less predictive ability, and in particular its 
‘elements’ (people) and ‘relations’ (social context) 
are constantly evolving, but as per natural science 
it attempts to identify laws that will, to a greater 
or lesser extent, allow prediction.
SARF in many ways parallels the message-belief 
processing stages of the individual that were 
described above, but does so by incorporating 
what we know about both the individual’s method 
of deriving knowledge, and that of their social 
environment. That is, it posits a cyclic process 
whereby various types of intra-individual and 
social infl uences will either amplify of attenuate 
perceived risk, with the outcome of such processes 
then playing a role in the next amplification/
attenuation stage relating to other types of intra-
individual and social infl uences. The task of risk 
communication in this case is thus to identify 
the factors that work to amplify or attenuate the 
perception of risk, and use this information to 
help anticipate the consequences of a particular 
statement, or ideally to help develop methods to 
interface with these determinants of risk perception 
to increase the chances of the desired outcome 
(i.e. belief that is consistent with the scientists’ 
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determination).
Bringing this back to the scientists’ determination 
that ‘low-level RF does not affect health’, this 
approach may identify, for example, that the actual 
scientifi c statement does not play a major role in 
determining the recipient’s subsequent belief, but 
rather that other non-science information does, 
such as information about confl icts of interest. 
Instead of focusing a risk communication message 
on the scientifi c outcome, it may thus dedicate the 
majority of the message to the issue of ‘confl ict of 
interest’, with the scientifi c statement representing 
only a minor part. Similarly, it may identify that 
within a particular culture, the similarity of RF 
to other more familiar agents is an important 
factor in helping the person interpret the science, 
and so greater comparative information may be 
emphasised, such as by explaining that coffee 
and RF are in the same IARC 2b category, or by 
explaining that RF is what FM radio transmissions 
have been using for many years. 
CUTTING THROUGH THE 
LIMITATIONS – SOME PRACTICAL RISK 
COMMUNICATION ADVICE!
As suggested by the last section, the complexity 
involved with moving from a message to a 
belief is substantial, and no simply recipe can 
be provided. However, a number of factors have 
been identifi ed that impact the way in which a 
message will be interpreted, and this knowledge 
provides sound principles with which to approach 
risk communication that will improve the chances 
of the message recipient’s belief matching the 
scientists’ determination. Here I briefl y describe 
one such set of recommendations that are based 
on solid theoretical understanding of how people 
generate beliefs, have direct applicability to the 
implementation of RF risk communication, and 
that are empirically supported. This was developed 
recently by Wiedemann and colleagues and is 
referred to as the ‘Credibility of Risk Assessment’ 
(CORA) framework8.
In essence, this framework treats the message 
recipient as an active agent trying to decide whether 
to adopt the intended message, and emphasises in 
the communication the (empirically-determined) 
issues that best enable the recipient to make such 
a determination. The framework emphasises 
six categories of information that need to be 
included in any risk communication: Overview 
(or background information); Accountability 
(the mandate of the group making the scientifi c 
statements, as well as their funding sources); 
Expertise and impartiality (the composition of 
the expert group, how it was selected and how 
impartiality was assured); Adherence with good 
scientifi c practices (the procedure for arriving 
at the conclusion, including how consensus was 
determined); Consultation and participation 
(procedures for accounting for confl icting views of 
those outside of the expert group); and Adherence 
with good reporting practice (balanced discussion 
of the evidence, clear linkage between the evidence 
and conclusions, uncertainty reported, and a plain 
language summary).
To me these are the same things that we as scientists 
or radiation safety professionals would be looking 
for when evaluating a risk communication 
(assuming that we weren’t planning on spending 
a few weeks reading the original literature itself), 
and so I see the framework as providing strong face 
validity. However it is noteworthy that few radiation 
protection messages provide this information, but 
instead focus more on the science itself. Indeed one 
of the functions of the CORA framework is as an 
evaluation tool for risk communication messages 
more generally, providing an opportunity to see 
whether information that is important to the 
message recipient has been omitted. Of course this 
framework does not ensure that the recipient will 
adopt the intended message, but rather it gives the 
recipient the opportunity to evaluate it effectively 
and reach a more reasonable determination. For 
example if the science underlying the determination 
that ‘there is no evidence that low-level RF affects 
health’ did indeed use poor methodologies, was 
not equipped to deal with confl icting views or 
was biased, then it would be reasonable to reject 
the intended message. In my view however, that 
would be a good outcome and testament to the 
success of the framework.
In addition to this I would emphasise the 
importance of communicating proactively. 
Given the effect of pre-existing beliefs on how 
we process new information (see above), it is 
particularly diffi cult for the message, no matter 
how well communicated it is, to allow the recipient 
to make a reasonable judgement if they have 
already taken the contra position. This is why, 
for example, certain information is suppressed 
by a court prior to a trial, as it is acknowledged 
that the way that it is presented in the media can 
make it diffi cult for a jury to arrive at a reasonable 
conclusion. In many ways it thus makes sense 
to focus communication on those who have not 
already committed themselves to strong positions. 
Working with schools and the community 
more generally represent great opportunities to 
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provide the information required to help people 
make informed decisions about risk, whereas 
communication is unlikely to be useful where 
strong bias (justifi ed or otherwise) is present.
Thus in terms of practical advice for risk 
communication, although there is great complexity 
in the way that information will be processed by 
the message recipient, I would suggest that the 
following simple steps will greatly enhance the 
process:
• Approach the task by viewing risk 
communication as an endeavour to improve 
people’s understanding of the science, rather 
than as a way of passing on facts;
• Treat the communication recipient as an active 
agent trying to make sense of the information, 
rather than someone whose beliefs need to 
be changed. If we believe that our processes 
of determining the message that we want to 
communicate are sound, we should view risk 
communication as an attempt to provide the 
communication recipient with an opportunity 
to consider the same steps of logic;
• Use a strong framework, such as CORA, to 
ensure that the issues that most people view 
as important are appropriately dealt with. 
Just as heuristics provide tangible benefi ts to 
humans, such frameworks (where supported 
by evidence) can be viewed as heuristics that 
improve our ability to link science with the 
community;
• Be proactive!
DRAWING THE LINE – A RISK 
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE!
Having described in detail the diffi culties associated 
with communicating the relative risks associated 
with RF (as well as some methods to improve this 
communication), we can now consider whether it 
is time to draw the line, to conclude that further RF 
health research will not be of use to the community. 
Drawing upon the discussion above, we can now 
conclude the following:
1. The RF-Health research to date is not suffi cient 
to allay the fears of the community.
 As argued above, this is not surprising given 
that, regardless of how conclusive this research 
might be on a scientific level, scientific 
knowledge accounts for only a small portion 
of the perceptions of the community. Thus even 
if substantially stronger conclusions could be 
reached regarding RF and health, this would 
not satisfy the community.
2. The RF-Health risk communication research 
is not sufficient to allay the fears of the 
community.
 As argued above, the way that humans derive 
meaning from data is exceedingly complex, 
and at least in the foreseeable future, will not 
be suffi ciently determined (and controlled) 
to enable science to effectively communicate 
its fi ndings to the community. Thus although 
risk communication can improve the 
situation and increase the number of people 
whose beliefs match the determinations 
of science, it is inconceivable that it could 
remove the ‘disconnect’ between scientifi c 
determinations and community perceptions. 
Thus the community will continue to demand 
further scientific investigation of the RF-
Health domain, independent of the scientifi c 
determinations themselves.
3. There is no line that can sensibly be drawn 
in terms of health or risk communication 
research.
 From a risk communication perspective it 
is relatively easy to see that our work will 
never be complete (and thus that no ‘risk 
communication’ line can be drawn), but 
although less obvious from a health research 
perspective, I would argue that the situation 
is the same. This is because we are trying 
to answer the community’s desire for better 
understanding of potential radiation risks, and 
it is not clear that it is for us (as opposed to the 
community) to draw such a line. For certain 
simple issues this may not be the case, such as 
if the community wanted to know which of two 
mountains had the highest peak, then having 
determined this unambiguously, regardless of 
how many ways it was re-asked or pressure put 
on the scientist, there would be nothing further 
that the scientist could offer.
However this is not the situation that we are faced 
with, and the only way that the scientist can decide 
to draw the line is via value judgements that go 
outside their domain of expertise. For example in 
the case of community concern that ‘long-term 
low-level RF exposure causes cancer’, I can 
draw on science to conclude that the experimental 
animal and epidemiological human research has 
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been strong, that there is no ‘positive evidence’ that 
chronic RF exposure could potentially cause cancer 
or that the extrapolation from animals to humans 
was insuffi cient, and thus I would personally take 
the view that it is suffi cient to stop and draw a line 
under RF cancer research. The problem is that the 
last step (concluding suffi ciency) is not scientifi c, 
it is a value judgement. Indeed it is an axiom of 
our research that we can never prove the null 
hypothesis, and so a value judgement is necessarily 
required in order to draw the line.
The question thus is whether it is up to the scientist, 
or up to the community to make such a value 
judgement. From a public health perspective we 
might have a better appreciation of the likelihood 
of fi nding something important to public health 
in the future, or we might be able to decide where 
it is best to spend the community’s resources so 
as to maximise the number of life-years within 
the community, but whether this is what the 
community values is a different matter, and one 
beyond the expertise of both the RF-health scientist 
and the risk communicator. Thus it is diffi cult to 
see how, except in the limited sense where there is 
a reference point such as ‘to maximise life-years’, 
a line can justifi ably be drawn under radiation 
health research.
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